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CHINA'S EUGENICS LAW AS GROUNDS FOR
GRANTING ASYLUM
Graciela G6mez
Abstract: China has instituted two controversial population control programs.
First instituted in 1979, the One Child Policy seeks to control population growth by
limiting the number of children born to married couples. The Maternal and Infant Health
Care Law ("Eugenics Law"), effective June of 1995, has a stated purpose of improving
the quality of the population by mandating sterilization for people with serious genetic
defects. Implementation of the One Child Policy has led to forced abortion and
involuntary sterilization. The Eugenics Law is likely to engender similar types of human
rights abuses. Since 1989, the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals has refused to give
asylum to Chinese nationals fleeing persecution because of reproductive rights violations.
This Comment analyzes the developments associated with denying asylum based on the
implementation of the One Child Policy and attempts to extrapolate the reasoning to
future claims based on the implementation of the Eugenics Law.
I. INTRODUCTION
Unrestrained population growth in the People's Republic of China
("PRC" or "China") presents potentially devastating economic and
ecological consequences.1  In an effort to decrease the growth rate of its
population, China has implemented two controversial programs. The One
Child Policy, one of the first of its type in the world, seeks to limit
2population growth by allowing married couples to have only one child.The Eugenics Law strives to reduce and perfect the Chinese population.3
See, e.g., Robert S. McNamara, Time Bomb or Myth: The Population Problem, 62 FOREIGN AFF.
1107, 1108 (1984); see also JOHN KING FAIRBANK, THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 21 (1980).
See Jennie A. Clarke, Note, The Chinese Population Policy: A Necessary Evil?, 20 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 321, 322 (1987). The first One Child Policy was espoused by Deng Xiaoping in 1978
with the implementation of the "Four Modernizations" campaign. Id at 329. The Four Modernizations
were agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. Id at 329 n.59. See discussion
infra art IL.A of the One Child Policy.
Daniel S. Gewirtz, Toward a Quality Population: China's Eugenic Sterilization of the Mentally
Retarded, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 139 (1994). While the concept of eugenics has fallen into
disrepute in the West, eugenics has gained credit in the People's Republic of China. Increasing population
quality appeals to the Chinese government because it supplements the government's current controls on
population quantity. See discussion infra part I1.B of the newly implemented Maternal and Infant Health
Care Law [hereinafter Eugenics Law].
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The implementation of the One Child Policy has led to human rights
abuses, including forced abortion and involuntary sterilization.4 The
Eugenics Law is likely to produce similar types of trespasses by the Chinese
government. Chinese fleeing these coercive practices have sought asylum
in the United States. Even though the United States has publicly denounced
China's population control policies and several administrations have
attempted to offer permanent refuge to its victims, asylum claims based on
China's One Child Policy have generally been denied . As one of the
world's leading nations, the United States must publicly and-powerfully
disassociate itself from the wholesale practice of forced abortion and
involuntary sterilization in China. It is vital that the United States take an
authoritative role in creating international pressure on China's government
to exhibit greater respect for the inalienable human right to protect and
control one's own body.
6
This Comment examines Chinese asylum claims based on China's
population control policies. It focuses particularly on asylum claims based
on China's One Child Policy and extrapolates the reasoning to future claims
based on the Eugenics Law. The first part of this Comment explores the
development of Chinese population control laws and their effect on
international relations with the United States. In addition, a brief regulatory
history of the various legislative and executive pronouncements concerning
asylum claims based on the One Child Policy is provided. The second part
of this Comment analyzes the pertinent case law, particularly the Board of
Immigration Appeal's ("BIA") precedential Matter of Chang7 decision.
The BIA's reasoning in Matter of Chang is scrutinized with an eye towards
future asylum claims based on the Eugenics Law. This Comment concludes
4 Criticism of the One Child Policy has focused on reported forced abortion, involuntary
sterilization, the coercive community pressures to persuade pregnant women to abort pregnancies, and
implantation of intra-uterine devices after abortions or births without the woman's consent. STEVEN
MOSHER, A MOTHER'S ORDEAL x (1994). See discussion infra part II.C on the effect of China's population
control policies on Sino-American relations.5 See, e.g., Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989); Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732
(2d Cir. 1995); Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331 (4th Cir. 1995); Guo Chun Di v. Moscato, 1995
U.S. App. LEXIS 25964 (4th Cir. 1995). To date there have been no asylum claims based on the Eugenics
Law.
6
Berta Hemandez, To Bear or Not to Bear: Reproductive Freedom as an International Human
Right, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 309, 357 (1991) (quoting Mogenthaler, Smoling and Scott v. The Queen, 44
D.L.R. 4th 385 (Can. 1988)).7 Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989). The Board of Immigration Appeals found that
implementation of the China's One Child Policy was not persecutory even to the extent that forced
abortion and involuntary sterilization may occur.
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that the United States should create decisive legislation to recognize valid
asylum claims based on the coercive Chinese population control policies,
particularly the Eugenics Law.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Towards Slowing Population Growth: The One Child Policy
With a fifth of the world's people and only seven percent of the
world's arable land, population control has been of central concern to the
Chinese government since the 1970s. 8  In the early years following the
founding of the PRC, population played a different role in Communist
ideology. Under the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong,9 Chinese were
encouraged to have children as part of their civic duty.'0 Chairman Mao did
not believe the economy's growth would be impaired by the availability of
land, raw materials, or investment. I1. Under Mao's rule, population growth
soared from 1.6 percent in 1949 to 2.8 percent in 1965.1 In 1979, the
Chinese leadership, faced with demographic data supporting the contention
that rapid population growth would slow economic growth, 13 revised their
strategy and launched the PRC's One Child Policy. 14 The One Child Policy
imposes upon its citizens a limit of one child per couple.
15
The motives behind China's One Child Policy have changed greatly.
At one extreme is the belief that a socialist economic system could benefit
from and accommodate a growing population; at the other is a fear that
8 Steven Mufson, Population Curbs Slip in China, 1.2 Billion Reached Five Years Early, WASH.
POST, Feb. 14, 1995, at Al7; JUDITH BANISTER, CHINA'S CHANGING POPULATION 165 (1987); BETSY
HARTMANN, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND WRONGS: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF POPULATION CONTROL AND
CONTRACEPTIVE CHOICE 159 (1987).9 Chairman Mao Zedong was the leader of the Communist Party of China in 1949 when the post-
revolution People's Republic of China was founded and ruled China until his death in 1976. BANISTER,
supralnote 8, at 18.
Chairman Mao's policy, based on the Marxist theory that a person could produce more than he
could consume, was to encourage population growth by instituting a system of incentives for government
workers to bear more children. Mao thus regarded each newborn Chinese as a set of productive hands
waitinl to work. Mufson, supra note 8; BANISTER, supra note 8, at 17.
BANISTER, supra note 8, at 17.
12 Mufson, supra note 8.
13 See BANISTER, supra note 8, at 183-84.
14 Mufson. supra note 8.
15
BANISTER, supra note 8, at 183-226.
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rapid population growth could slow and imperil the socialist transformation
of the economy.16  The One Child Policy was introduced after extensive
discussions concerning the need to control population growth if China was
to achieve its modernization goals.17 Because of a lack of consensus among
the leadership, the National People's Congress ("NPC") did not pass a
national law regarding incentives and penalties, rather, it outlined a "family
planning" policy 18 of limited births. The principle of and duty to practice
family planning is set forth in the 1980 Marriage Law' 9 and in the 1982
Constitution.
20
While the PRC has no national law on population control per se, the
Constitution does provide that the state shall carry out family planning to
control the size of the population and that spouses have a duty to follow the
state's policy. 21 The Marriage Law of 1980 sets the minimum marriage age
and places responsibility for birth control on both spouses.22 The provinces
16 See HARTMANN, supra note 8, at 159.
17 Sharon K. Hom, Female Infanticide in China: The Human Rights Specter and Thoughts Towards
(An)Other Vision, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 264-65 (1991-1992). "Every year in China some 10
million couples of young men and women will reach marriageable age and they will marry and have
children. At the existing rate of population growth, China will have a population of 1,300 million by the
end of the century. If the population is to grow to such a size, we will be compelled to devote a
considerable amount of financial and material resources to feeding the newly increased populace. That
will inevitably slow down the four modernizations. We plan to lower the country's natural rate of
population growth to around 5 per thousand by 1985 .... This means that on the average each couple as
of now can have only one child." BANISTER, supra note 8, at 184 (quoting Deputy Qian Xinzhong,
Chinese Minister of Public Health when the One Child Policy was introduced in 1979).18 The family planning policy fixes a general population growth target. The policy strives not only
to encourage delayed marriages, but also to push the population towards giving birth to fewer, but
healthier, children. Exceptions to the one child limit are allowed in geographical areas made up primarily
of minority groups. Since 1979, there has been a relaxation in the implementation of the One Child Policy
in rural areas to allow a second child if the first child is a girl or is handicapped because of beliefs of
widespread infanticide. Additionally, "Document No. 7," issued in 1984 by the Central Party Committee
advised a flexible approach to the One Child Policy in certain circumstances, including exceptions where a
parent or the first child was handicapped, for overseas Chinese, national minorities, those in hazardous
occupations, and for couples who both were only children or for men whose brothers were all infertile.
Hom, supra note 17, at 263-69.19 Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China ch. I, art. 2 (1980), translated in RALPH H.
FOLSOM ET AL., LAW AND POLITICS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 261 (1992) [hereinafter PRC
LAWS .
The CONSTITUTION (PRC), article XXV, provides: "[t]he state promotes family planning so that
population growth may fit the plans for economic and social development." See also PRC LAWS, supra
note 19, at 98-103.
21
PRC LAWS, supra note 19, at 261.
22 Article 5 of the Marriage Law provides that no marriage shall be contracted before the man has
reached 22 years of age and the woman 20 years of age. A marriage is not permitted even with parental
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and the cities are free to enact their own regulations on population control,
but the population control program is guided by a February 1982 joint
directive of the Chinese Communist Party and the central government
entitled "On the Further Implementation of Family Planning Work."
23
The implementation of the policy is left to local and provincial
officials responsible for ensuring compliance through economic sanctions,
peer pressure, and propaganda. 24 Every unit 25 has a birth control committee
headed by Party officials. These Party officials keep records of births,
marriages, and menstrual cycles of every woman of child-bearing age.26
The date and sex of every birth is recorded and posted.27 Compliance with
family planning policies is tied to citizens' salaries, their eligibility to
occupy housing space and to grow crops, and their educational
opportunities, as well as their ability to marry and have children. 28 Local
officials receive cash bonuses, recognition, and promotions only if their
units meet the birth control limits.29  More importantly, cadres who are
unwilling to compel people to practice birth control face public reprimands
from the central government and Chinese Communist Party ("CCP"), and
face economic sanctions from all levels of the administrative hierarchy
above them. Of primary importance is securing compliance by all couples
of childbearing age in their work unit. Couples who continue pregnancies
which are not allowed may suffer the suspension of wages, fines, and loss of
seniority for promotions. The means of attaining the one child goal is
consent if one party is below the legal age. Marriage Law, art. 5, translated in PRC LAWS, supra note 19,
at 263.23 The One Child Policy provides that state cadres and urban residents are allowed one child per
couple, with exceptions when special permission is granted. Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 at 5-6 (BIA
1989) (citing Letter from Library of Congress to Immigration and Naturalization Service dated Nov. 23,
1987)4 See also BANISTER, supra note 8.
Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989).
25 A unit is a workplace group or a rural governing body. PRC LAWS, supra note 19, at 78.
26
Mufson, supra note 8.
27
Mufson, supra note 8.
28
BANISTER, supra note 8, at 184-85.
29 BANISTER, supra note 8, at 197-200. See also Michael Weisskopf, One Couple, One Child:
Abortion Policy Tears at China's Society, WASH. POST., Jan. 7, 1985, at Al.30 BANISTER, supra note 8, at 197.
31 Matter of Chang, int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989); PRC LAWS, supra note 19, at 267.
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allowed to vary depending on local conditions as long as the desired result
is achieved.
32
The One Child Policy has been plagued by inconsistent regional
implementation and a strong peasant resistance.33 Several factors contribute
to the varying degrees of implementation. The incentives of housing, better
schooling, or health and medical benefits may mean more in the urban areas
because of the availability of different quality levels of service.34 In some
instances, inadequate funding for the incentives offered, and the flexibility
granted to the local cadres faced with enforcing an unpopular policy, has led
many cadres to essentially revise the policy to allow for more children.
35
Ironically, the improvement in living standards obtained through population
control has helped farmers, who view large families as a means of getting
additional field hands and old age insurance, to pay the fines imposed for
having more than one child.36
The PRC government claims not to support or encourage forced
sterilization or abortions, but does concede that they occur, albeit
unauthorized, at the hands of local officials.37  PRC officials claim that
when abusive practices are discovered, the local officials are retrained or
disciplined.38  The government admits that stronger punishment is rare and
no documented cases of punishment exist.
39
The abuses reported are disturbing. Claims of forced abortions
occurring only weeks or days from birth, of aborted late-term babies
allowed to cry until dead in trash cans, of doctors injecting infants' heads
with formaldehyde, and of doctors crushing their skulls with forceps, are
not uncommon. 40  Others report that women are sometimes snatched from
32
BANISTER, supra note 8, at 197.
33
Horn, supra note 17, at 265.
34
Horn, supra note 17, at 265.
35
BANISTER, supra note 8, at 199-202.
36 Mufson, supra note 8.
37 DEPARTMENT OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1994, report
submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States House of Representatives and the Committee
on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. 561 (1994) [hereinafter Country Reports
on Human Rights]. For a list of official and semiofficial statements from the PRC proclaiming the family
planning program as entirely voluntary, see BANISTER, supra note 8, at 192-95.38'''
Country Reports on Human Rights, supra note 37, at 561.
39 Country Reports on Human Rights, supra note 37, at 561.
40 MOSHER, supra note 4, at 254-55 (recounting the story of a 38-year-old Chinese mother who
became pregnant with her second child while in the United States with her husband, was threatened by the
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their beds late at night and brought to 24-hour sterilization clinics, 41 that
intra-uterine devices are inserted immediately after giving birth without the
woman's knowledge, as national regulations require the insertion of an
intra-uterine device and forbid its removal after a woman's first child.42
Additionally, powerful social coercion and stiff economic'sanctions may be
employed .4
B. Towards Improving the Quality of the Population: The Eugenics Law
While China's existing One Child Policy is an attempt at limiting
population growth, the recently enacted Eugenics Law" attempts to
improve the quality of the newborn population45 and to reduce the perceived
burden of disability to Chinese society.46 The overall goal is not only
fewer, but also healthier, babies. Because the government allows married
couples only one child, it is important that this one child be healthy and
without any physical or mental defects of hereditary or environmental
origin47 that may trigger a relaxation of the One Child Policy allowing a
couple a second child. If a couple's first child has a genetic defect or is
sickly, the couple may apply for an exception.to the one child limit, which
is supposed to be granted if their political unit has been allocated a large
PRC government to get rid of the child or face the consequences, and was ultimately granted political
asylum in the United States).41 Bai Fangdai was granted asylum in 1994 after testifying that when she was eight months pregnant
with her second child, she was dragged from her home after midnight and brought to a clinic, where she
suffered induced labor and her newborn was strangled. Matt Miller, Harsh China Policy Works to Break I
Famil I Child Rule Is to Be an Enemy of the State, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 29, 1994, at A14.
BANISTER, supra note 8, at 205-07. See also MOSHER, supra note 4, at 249.
43 Country Reports on Human Rights, supra note 37, at 561.
44 First introduced as "On Population Health and Eugenics" in December 1993. Due to international
criticism, China modified the language used in its marriage law, deleting the words "eugenic" and
"sterilization." China-Human Rights: Beying Waters Down Eugenics Law, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 7,
1994, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, INPRES File. For a discussion of mental retardation in China
and the Chinese government's postulation of eugenics laws designed to enhance the population quality, see
Gewirtz, supra note 3.
Chinese Minister Defends New Eugenics Law, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 1, 1995, available
in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.46 Western Eyes on China's Eugenics Law, THE LANCET, July 15, 1995, at 131, available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
47 BANISTER, supra note 8, at 222.
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enough quota of births in its birth plan.48  Therefore, the birth of
handicapped children works against the government's stated goal of
limiting population growth by allowing only one child per couple.49
In addition, the government desires to distribute the scarce
governmental resources to those 5.roductive members of society who are
capable of caring for themselves. Once a child is born "inferior," there is
little guarantee of the quality of care and services that the child will
receive. 5 Hospital administrators typically treat only those with at least a
moderate IQ, excluding those persons with severe retardation whose
treatment would not be considered worthwhile. 53  Those chosen for
treatment receive some form of education until their late teens, and are then
placed in a job where they receive room and board along with a modest
income.54  These minimal services are almost nonexistent in the rural
areas. 55  Moreover, disabled infants who would not be able to work when
they come of age are considered shameful and are often abandoned or
killed. 56
48 "If it's a genetic defect and there's a likelihood of a second retarded child, then the couple is
discouraged from having another one. But if not-if it's a birth trauma or a post-natal trauma, for
example--then they're encouraged to have the second child." Lennie Magida, Population Pressures,
Cultural Stigma Limit Lives of Mentally Retarded People, HARTFORD COURANT, June 14, 1995, at AI
(quoting Dr. Zhang Jingquing, pediatrician and director of the Shanghai Hongkou District Children's
Welfare Institution, a worn and cramped facility that serves about 90 students with retardation).
49 "The advocacy of eugenics plays an important role in the control of population. If a couple gives
birth to a deformed or retarded child, they are bound to demand a second child. This would not only
increase the proportion of the population who are of inferior quality, but it would also increase the birth
rate." BANISTER, supra note 8, at 222.
50 Total spending in 1993 by China's government and by collectives for orphans, disabled, elderly,
and young persons in society-of whom people with retardation are but a small part-was roughly $138
million. By comparison the budget for Connecticut's Department of Mental Retardation for fiscal year
1995 is $545 million. Connecticut has 3.2 million people. Magida, supra note 48.
51 The large numbers of disabled Chinese children overwhelm the limited number of physical and
occupational therapists available. Id
52
A moderate IQ is one of 40 or above. Id.
53 Id.
54 Several Special Olympics athletes from Shanghai graduated from the Shanghai Children's
Welfare Institution. They now do packaging work at an appliance factory, working alongside employees
of normal intelligence and living in the company dormitory. They earn about $35 a month, the average
salary for packaging work. Id.55
A retarded person living in the countryside is not necessarily doomed. "Every village seems to
have at least one retarded person that everyone looks out for. They're literally like the village idiots, but at
least they're not condemned or put away." Id (quoting Anne Thurston, author and China specialist).
56 Id. Chinese society has traditionally favored sons over daughters. A consequence of the One
Child Policy has been an increase in the number of female babies killed and abandoned: if families will be
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The Eugenics Law makes compulsory for everyone a premarital
medical examination for serious genetic diseases, some infectious diseases,
and relevant mental disorders. 57 If the disorder is serious enough, long-term
contraception or tubal ligation is to be used to enforce childlessness;
otherwise, the couple will not be allowed to marry. 58  During pregnancy,
prenatal testing will also be compulsory, followed by termination if the
fetus has a serious genetic or somatic disorder.5 9  Voluntary termination
remains an option, but compulsory termination seems to occur at the
discretion of the doctor. Finally, the law bans fetal sex identification to
combat a deeply ingrained traditional preference for sons that prompt many
families to abort female fetuses.
6'
Particularly troubling are several ambiguous articles in the Eugenics
Law that describe pre-marital checkups and health care during a woman's
child-bearing years. Article 10 states that doctors carrying out the pre-
marital checkup "shall explain and give medical advice to both the male and
the female who have been diagnosed with certain genetic diseases of a
serious nature which is considered to be inappropriate for child-bearing
from a medical point of view." 62  The problem is that the statute fails to
define which genetic diseases are of a "serious nature." 63 Article 16 states
that if a doctor suspects that a married person has a genetic disease of a
allowed only one child, they would prefer a son over a daughter. There is hardly any doubt that female
babies who suffer from handicaps are killed and abandoned at a higher rate than are healthy female babies.
See generally Hom, supra note 17 (in depth analysis of female infanticide in China).
57 The Eugenics Law does not define which mental disorders would be considered serious enough
for the law to be implemented. Western Eyes on China's Eugenics Law, supra note 46. Tom Wilkie,
Abortion forced on "defective families," THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 2, 1995, at 10, available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library, CURNWS File.




61 Sun Nianfu, a senior obstetrician at Beijing's Capitol Hospital, noted that the sex of the fetus
would be disclosed, however, in those instances where it is medically necessary, for example, when there is
the possibility of sex-linked diseases. Admittedly, it would be difficult to safeguard against sex selection in
a country with a population of 1.2 billion. China: Mother and Child Health Care Law Takes Effect,
AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK, Abortion Report, June 1, 1995. See Horn, supra note 17, at 251.
62 Hawkes, supra note 58.
63 The Eugenics Law is designed to target genetic diseases that may totally or partially prevent the
victim from living independently. Some analysts are concerned that this might include conditions as
common as a harelip and cleft palate, which often go uncorrected because the parents of affected children
cannot afford the operation. Hawkes, supra note 58 (quoting Chen Minzhang, Chinese Health Minister).
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serious nature, that person or their partner "shall take measures in
accordance with the physician's medical advice." 64  Taken in conjunction
with Article 10, this implies an obligation to make a prenatal diagnosis and
possibly terminate the pregnancy. In addition, Article 9 stipulates that
people affected by "specified" infectious diseases and mental illness should
postpone their marriages.65  Many "specified" diseases, however, are
curable even during pregnancy and do not harm the fetus.
66
Critics charge that the Chinese government's goal of reducing the
birth rate of disabled children is untenable. 67  Many defects arise
spontaneously, and all humans carry hidden genetic defects that have no
effect unless they have a child with someone carrying the same genetic
defect.68 Having one disabled child in such circumstances does not mean
that the next child will also be disabled. 69 Furthermore, because many birth
defects have no known cause, preventing them remains impossible. 70
Moreover, critics have argued that the Eugenics Law will
disproportionately affect ethnic minorities, frontier peoples, and the poor,
because of the perception that the problem of inferior births is most acute
amongst these groups.7 1 To them, the Eugenics Law represents an abuse of
72private genetic information and a violation of human rights. Aside from
moral arguments, 3 commentators suggest that the new measures will not be
64 Hawkes, supra note 58.
65 Specified infectious diseases include AIDS, gonorrhea, syphilis, leprosy, and all other infectious
diseases considered to affect pregnancy. Chan Wai-Fong, Law Bans Pregnancy by "Unfit" Mothers, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 8, 1994, at 7.66 Id.
67
Hawkes, supra note 58.
68
Hawkes, supra note 58.
69 Hawkes, supra note 58.
70 BANISTER, supra note 8, at 225.
7'
Anthony O'Brien, China's Genetics Law, THE TIMES (London), June 13, 1995, available in
LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File (responding to Nigel Hawkes' report on Eugenics Law, supra note
58) (quoting Health Minister Cheng Minzhang who first proposed the Eugenics Law to the NPC in 1993).
Additionally, Chinese academic Deng Bihai has described Chinese minority groups as "low in population
quality" a term that he explained included not just hereditary diseases, but also mental retardation,
illiteracy, and physical deformities such as low stature. Critics believe that the Eugenics Law is ethically
suspect at the best of times, but from the perspective of Tibetans and other non-Chinese peoples under
Chinese rule, it looks like another facet of the "final solution." Id
72
Wilkie, supra note 57.
73 Moral grounds for objecting to the Eugenics Law have been described by British commentators as
arrogant and ethnocentrist given the inconceivable scale of China's population problems. These
commentators recommend that instead of any type of boycott of Chinese goods because of the Eugenics
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effective because implementation will be discretionary and sporadic, and
the population will find ways to circumvent the law.74  Finally, it is
expected that the law will carry immense service costs and require highly
specialized caregivers.75 Such elaborate screening before marriage is not
likely to become commonplace for some time, especially in rural areas,
because it is expensive, time-consuming, and requires medical exertise to
detect potential hereditary defects or incurable infectious diseases.
C. Chinese Population Control Policies: Their Impact on Sino-
American Relations
The coercive nature of China's population control policies has had a
chilling impact on Sino-American relations. While the world encouraged
China to control its population growth in the mid 1970s," the U.S.
government has been outraged by China's implementation of the One Child
Policy, particularly the reports of forced abortion and involuntary
sterilization.78  The United States has reacted to these human rights
violations by condemning the Chinese government, 79 demanding human
rights improvements, and threatening economic sanctions.81
Law, Western doctors and scientists cooperate with Chinese colleagues to develop effective ways to limit
the growth of China's population. Western Eyes on China s Eugenics Law, supra note 46.
74 Western Eyes on China's Eugenics Law, supra note 46.
75
Western Eyes on China's Eugenics Law, supra note 46; see also BANISTER, supra note 8, at 225.76 Western Eyes on China's Eugenics Law, supra note 46.
77
See Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989).
78 In addition to the practice of forced abortion and involuntary sterilization, the United States
government has condemned China for the inhumane treatment of prisoners, the use of prison labor to
manufacture exported goods, the restrictions on emigration, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the
imprisonment of political and religious dissidents, and the lack of protection to Tibet's distinctive religious
and cultural heritage. Christian Sornson, U.S. Report Card Cites China Failure, THE DAILY YOMIURI, Oct.
23, 1993, at 5, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.79 "Civilizations can be judged by how they treat women, children, old people, and strangers.
Vulnerable people bring out the kindness in every society, and also the cruelty. Every so often they
become the object of practices so vile that they will cause people to recoil in horror across the centuries.
One such practice is forced abortion. The government of China now routinely compels women to abort
their 'unauthorized' unborn children." Testimony of Congressman Christopher H. Smith, Chairman,
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, May 17,
1995.80 While forced abortion was considered a crime in the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, today it is
"employed regularly, with chilling effectiveness and unbearable pain, upon women in the People's
Republic of China. Women in China are required to obtain a birth coupon before conceiving a child.
Chinese women are hounded by the population control police, and even their menstrual cycles are publicly
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The Chinese government has denied that forced abortion and
involuntary sterilization are part of the official policy. 82  The
implementation of the policy by local officials or cadres involves, according
to government officials, persuasion and education until the woman agrees.83
However, high officials have recognized that in some cases, cadres have
been excessively brutal in forcing women to cooperate.84 These cadres are
dealt with through education in a "good style of work." 85
The United States has remained suspicious of the Chinese central
government, applying diplomatic and economic pressure in an effort to curb
human rights violations. Since 1985, the United States has stopped
contributing to the United Nations Fund for Population Activities
("UNFPA"), which funds Chinese population control programs. 86  Critics
believe that the UNFPA legitimizes and demonstrates tacit approval of
China's coercive population control policies by providing capital. 87  TheClinton Administration's efforts in 1993 to restore funding to the UNFPA,
monitored as one means of ensuring compliance." Congressman Smith pointed to a New York Times
expose asserting that when "[the Chinese authorities] discover an unauthorized pregnancy, an illegal child,
[they] normally apply a daily dose of threats and browbeating. They wear the women down. Eventually, if
the women does not succumb to the abortion, she is physically forced to submit." Moreover, Congressman
Smith described the Chinese govemment's issuance of the Eugenics Law as "eerily reminiscent of Nazi
Germany." Id.
Testimony of Congressman Gerald B. Solomon, to the Subcommittee on Trade, Capitol Hill
Heari8g Testimony, May 23, 1995 [hereinafter Solomon Testimony].
See Peter Seidlitz, The Mother of Four Who Controls China's One-Child Family Planning Policy,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 27, 1993, at 8.
83 "Emphasis is laid on the combination of state guidance with people's willingness. The control
effort has been accepted by the people through persuasion and education. For example, in order to have a
woman agree to birth control, persuasion may have to be applied many times. Some foreign people regard
it as an act of forcing her to do something. We in China consider it to be persuasion and reasoning until
she agrees. It may take quite some persuasion work on a farmer before she can accept an idea." Id
(quoting Chinese Health Minister Peng answering the question whether the government's crackdown was
hard and inhumane in order to reach the aggressive population goals).
84 Minister Peng admitted that there are some cadres whose work is "not entirely satisfactory." Id
85
86 The United Nations Fund for Population Activities [hereinafter UNFPA] provides about $10
million a year for population control programs. China spends about $1.2 billion on population control.
AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK ABORTION REPORT, Nov. 1I, 1993.
87 U.S. Rep. Chris Smith has denounced the UNFPA's complicity in China's practices of forced
abortion and involuntary sterilization. Id
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under the condition that no U.S. funds could go to China, were blocked by
pro-life groups.
88
The 1995 United Nations Women's Conference provided a forum to
expose Chinese abuses to the international community and caused further
deterioration in relations between the United States and China.8 9  Some
commentators had been optimistic that Hillary Clinton's9 visit to Beijing
could be a diplomatic ice-breaker with the Chinese government.
91
However, just before the Conference, Sino-American relations "soured
badly,, 92 and although the First Lady did attend the Conference, she did so
in a non-diplomatic capacity. 93 While in China, the U.S. delegation took the
opportunity to publicly denounce China's use of coercive population control
practices,9 4 further straining Sino-American relations.
95
China's human rights abuses have also figured prominently in the
debate surrounding U.S. renewal of China's Most Favored Nation ("MEN")
status. In June of 1993, the Clinton Administration extended MFN96 status
88 U.S. Rep. Chris Smith and two Chinese nationals filed suit to forbid the Agency for International
Development ("AID") from funding the UNFPA on the ground that the UNFPA does not meet the
eligibility requirements for funding under U.S. law. Id.
89 International relations between the United States and China had deteriorated because of many
factors, including the U.S. issuance of a visa to Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui in direct defiance of the
Chinese leadership's wishes, China's missile sales transgressions, the U.S. involvement in blocking
China's entrance into the World Trade Organization, China's unresponsiveness to software piracy issues,
and the U.S. $30 billion trade imbalance. Simon Beck, Hillary on Alert for Diplomatic Mission, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, June 30, 1995, at 26.
90 The First Lady, Mrs. Hillary Rodham Clinton, had expressed a desire to head the U.S. delegation




94 Dede Nickerson, Rights Attack "'Mars" Meeting, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 7, 1995, at 8
(quoting Madeleine Albright, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, "At the heart of the Universal
Declaration [on Human Rights] is a fundamental distinction between coercion and choice. No woman-
whether in Birmingham, Bombay, Beirut, or Beijing-should be forcibly sterilized or forced to have an
abortion."). See also U.S. Congressman Condemns Chinese Right's Abuse, Surveillance, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Sept. 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File (U.S. Rep. Chris Smith urged
the U.S. delegation to condemn China's draconian family planning policy, including forced abortion and
involuntary sterilization, limiting urban couples to one child as well as severely restricting the number
permitted to rural families).
95 China's displeasure over Mrs. Clinton's comments was reflected by her treatment as a non-person
by the domestic media. There was limited mention of Mrs. Clinton in the official newspapers and Mrs.
Clinton did not appear on television. Nickerson, supra note 94.
96 China has had 14 years of Most Favored Nation ("MFN") status in the United States. Solomon
Testimony, supra note 81.
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to China for another year, but made the 1994 renewal conditional on Beijing
meeting President Clinton's demands for human rights improvements,
including ensuring that forced abortion and involuntary sterilization were
not part of China's rigid family planning policy.97 In 1994, MFN status was
again extended by the Administration even though China had done little to
improve its human rights record.
98
Critics charge that MFN status should not be granted until China
makes significant improvements in human rights.99 Proponents of granting
MFN status argue that opening up the avenues of commerce with China will
create a natural flow of human rights improvements by bettering the socio-
economic status of Chinese citizens.' 00  What is certainly true is that MEN
status means big business to China: Chinese exports to the United States
rose by 223% between 1989 and 1994, while the United States exports to
China rose by only 60%. 101 China will likely continue to defy international102
pressure as long as it receives the benefits that keep its economy strongand growing, and perceives Western threats as meaningless.
D. Regulatory History ofAsylum Claims Based on the One Child Policy
Because of its rather recent enactment, there have been no asylum
claims based on the Eugenics Law. However, it is clear that if forced
abortion and involuntary sterilization are used as a means of
97
US. Warns China to Improve Human Rights as Dialogue Resumes, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct.
12, 1993, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File (John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State
for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, met with and made clear to Chinese officials that without
"significant overall progress" in human rights, MFN status would not be extended in June 1994. The
Clinton Administration demanded improvements in the following areas: the release and accounting of
political and religious prisoners, the humane treatment of prisoners, the freedom of emigration, the
implementation of the 1992 agreement banning the export of goods made by prison labor, the protection of
Tibet's religious and cultural heritage, and the start of a meaningful dialogue with Tibet's exiled religious
leader, the Dalai Lama. Additionally, the President urged China to take steps to ensure that forced abortion
and involuntary sterilization are not part of China's rigid family planning policy.).
98
Extending MFN status in 1994 definitely de-link trade and human rights concems. Solomon
Testimony, supra note 81.
99
Solomon Testimony, supra note 81.100
Solomon Testimony, supra note 81.
101 In 1989, about 23% of China's exports came to the United States. In 1994, that figure rose to
nearly 37%, creating a trade deficit of $29.5 billion. Solomon Testimony, supra note 81.102 England has demanded that the Chinese government desist from practicing compulsory
abortions and forced sterilization. David Wallen, British MPs Call for UN Venue to Change, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, June 21, 1995, at 9.
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implementation, the Eugenics Law is likely to produce asylum claims
similar to those under the One Child Policy. As such, the legal analysis and
background history of asylum claims based on the One Child Policy might
have implications for future asylum claims based on the Eugenics Law.
1. The Refugee Act of 1980
The Refugee Act of 1980103 ("Refugee Act") governs asylum
procedures for refugees in the United States and establishes an overseas
refugee admissions program. 104  The Refugee Act incorporates the
international definition of "refugee" from the United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees. 10 5 By adopting a universal approach to
refugee admissions consistent with international standards and norms, the
Refugee Act emphasizes "special humanitarian concerns."'
10 6
An alien seeking asylum must demonstrate that he or she is a
"refugee" within the meaning of the Immigration and Naturalization Act
("INA"). To establish eligibility for asylum, an alien bears the burden of
demonstrating that he or she meets the four separate elements required by
section 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA: (1) the alien must have a "fear of
persecution;" (2) the fear must be "well-founded;"' 1 7 (3) the persecution
must be "on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion;" and (4) the alien must be
"unable or unwilling to return" to his country of nationality because of his
well-founded fear of persecution. 108
103 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
and 22 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Refugee Act].104 There are two different ways for a refugee to obtain asylum: political asylum and overseas
refugee programs. Each program has its own distinctive procedures, constraints, and legal and policy
dilemmas. This Comment primarily discusses political asylum claims. Issues relating to overseas refugee
programs are outside the scope of this Comment. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 208(a).105 Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the
Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 9, 11 (1981) (citing United Nations Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees (1951) as incorporated into U.S. law by the United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (1967)). By assenting to the Protocol, the United
States intended to set an example for other nations and promote humanitarian concerns. David T. Parish,
Note, Membership in a Particular Social Group Under the Refugee Act of 1980; Social Identity and the
Legal Concept of the Refugee, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 923, 925-26 (1992).106 Anker & Posner, supra note 105, at II.
107 To show a well-founded fear of persecution, the applicant must show that his fear is both
subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,436 (1987).
108 INA § 101(a)(42)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42).
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2. Regulatory History
The regulatory history of asylum claims based on Chinese population
control policies is fraught with inconsistencies. The general confusion and
lack of a coherent policy for adjudicating asylum claims based on
reproductive rights violations stems from a conflict between executive and
legislative action and the administrative rulings of various agencies. !° 9  In
spite of the rather purposeful efforts by the executive branch and the Houses
of Congress to achieve the opposite outcome, the federal courts have upheld
asylum denials based on China's One Child Policy. The courts reviewing
these decisions have found that under established administrative law, none
of these legislative pronouncements have displaced or overruled the BIA's
decision in Matter of Chang. 110
In August 1988, Attorney General Edwin Meese issued guidelines to
the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") stating that asylum
could be granted to applicants alleging a well-founded fear of persecution
based on China's coercive family planning programs.' 1' In 1989, the BIA
considered China's One Child Policy in its precedential case, Matter of
Chang. l2 The BIA found that Attorney General Meese's guidelines did not
control their analysis because it was directed to the INS rather than to the
Immigration Judges and the BIA."13 In concluding that China's One Child
109 Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989).
110 Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 737 (2d Cir. 1995).
III Id. at 738 (citing Memo from the Office of Attorney General Edwin Meese to Immigration and
Naturalization Service Commissioner Alan Nelson, Aug. 5, 1988, at I). Attorney General Meese's Memo
stated in pertinent part:
All INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service] asylum adjudicators are to give careful
consideration to applications from nationals of the People's Republic of China [PRC] who
express a fear of persecution upon return to the PRC because they refuse to abort a pregnancy or
resist sterilization after the birth of a second or subsequent child in violation of Chinese
Communist Party directives on population. If such refusal is undertaken as an act of conscience
with full awareness of the urgent priority assigned to that policy by high level PRC officials and
local party cadres at all levels as well as of the severe consequences which may be imposed for
violation of the policy, it may be appropriate to view such refusal as an act of political defiance
sufficient to establish refugee status under 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A).
112 Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989).
113 Id
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Policy was not 14ersecutory on its face, the BIA denied the petitioner's
asylum request.
In July 1989, Congress considered the Emergency Chinese
Immigration Relief Act of 1989115 in reaction to Matter of Chang and the
contemporaneous events of Tiananmen Square.l16 The proposed legislation
would have effectively overruled Matter of Chang and allowed refugee
status to be conferred on the basis of China's family planning policies.
President Bush, however, vetoed the Act after it was passed by Congress
because statutory codification of such measures would interfere with
ongoing diplomatic initiatives. 
117
To mollify opposition, President Bush implemented all of the bill's
provisions concerning Chinese nationals opposing the PRC's One Child
Policy."i8  He directed the Attorney General to give enhanced consideration
to asylum seekers fleeing any country's policy of forced abortion or coerced
sterilization. 19  In January 1990, Attorney General Dick Thomburgh
promulgated an interim rule ("January 1990 Interim Rule") consistent with
114
The BIA found that the One Child Policy was not subterfuge for persecuting any portion of the
Chinese citizenry. The BiA concluded that China's government is concerned not only with the ability of
its citizens to survive, but also with their housing, education, medical services, and other benefits of life
that persons in many other societies take for granted. The One Child Policy, the BIA resolved, has the
legitimate goal of controlling population growth, even to the extent that forced abortion and involuntary
sterilization may occur, and it is applied generally to the entire population. Id115 Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 739 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing the Emergency Chinese
Immigration Relief Act of 1989, § 3(a), H.R. 2712, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)). The Emergency
Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989 provided standards to be applied in adjudicating applications for
asylum, among other things, from Chinese fleeing coercive population control policies. Specifically
China's One Child Policy: "If the applicant establishes that such applicant has refused to abort or be
sterilized, such applicant shall be considered to have established a well-founded fear of persecution, if
returned to China, on the basis of political opinion consistent with paragraph (42XA) of section 101(a) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a))." Id.
116
On June 4, 1989, the Chinese Communist Central Party crushed the pro-democracy movement
in Beijing. The world watched as the People's Liberation Army killed over 1000 civilians with the use of
military power. LAWRENCE R. SULLIVAN, CHINA SINCE T1ANANMEN, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL
CONFLICTS 1(1995).
117
Mem. of Disapproval for the Emergency Chinese Relief Act of 1989, 25 WEEKLY
COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1853-54 (1989). See also 66 Interp. Rel. 1331 (1989).
Although the House of Representatives mustered the two-thirds vote required to override the Presidential
veto, the Senate fell short by five votes and the bill never became law. 135 Cong. Rec. S. Doc. No. 8241-2
(July 19 1989).
Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331, 1336 (4th Cir. 1995).
119 Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d at 739; see also Robert Suro, Chinese Join Haitians in
Special "Relief' Status, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 1995, at A 10.
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President Bush's directive. 12  The January 1990 Interim Rule was duly
published in the Federal Register for comments.'
2'
In April 1990, President Bush issued an executive order directing the
Attorney General to implement the January 1990 Interim Rule.
12 2
Mysteriously, however, in July 1990, the Attorney General published a final
rule outlining comprehensive procedures to be used in determining asylum
under INA section 208 that did not mention the January 1990 Interim
Rule. 123
Attorney General William P. Barr sought to end the confusion
generated by the omission of the January 1990 Interim Rule by signing a
final rule in January 1993 ("January 1993 Final Rule") that would grant
asylum to aliens who were victims of their country's population control
policies. 124  One effect of the January 1993 Final Rule was to overrule
120 The January 1990 Interim Rule provided that:
(I) Aliens who have a well-founded fear that they will be required to abort a pregnancy or to
be sterilized because of their country's family planning policies may be granted asylum on the
ground of persecution on account of political opinion; (2) An applicant who establishes that the
applicant (or the applicant's spouse) has refused to abort a pregnancy or to be sterilized in
violation of a country's family planning policy, and who has a well-founded fear that he or she
will be required to abort a pregnancy or to be sterilized or otherwise persecuted if the applicant
were returned to such country may be granted asylum.
Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d at 739 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.5, 55 Fed. Reg. 2803, 2805).
121 ld
122 On April 11, 1990, President Bush directed the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to
"provide for enhanced consideration under the immigration laws for individuals ... who express a fear of
persecution . . . related to [the country of origin's] policy of forced abortion or coerced sterilization, as
implemented by the Attorney General's regulation effective January 29, 1990." Id. at 739 (citing Exec.
Order No. 12,711, § 4, 55 Fed. Reg. 13,897 (1990)). See also Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331,
1337 (4th Cir. 1995).123
Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d at 739 (citing 55 Fed. Reg. 30674). The final rule
published in July 1990 did not mention forced abortion or involuntary sterilization, the One Child Policy,
or the PRC. No explanation for this omission was offered by the Attorney General and none can be
deduced from the July 1990 Rule. Id. The Fourth Circuit speculated that the January 1990 Rule did not
appear in the annual codification because it did not survive the comprehensive revision of the asylum and
withholding regulations. Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331, 1337 (4th Cir. 1995).124 On January 15, 1993, Attorney General William P. Barr signed a final rule which provided in
part:
[A]pplicant (and the applicant's spouse, if also an applicant) shall be found to be a refugee
on the basis of past persecution on account of political opinion if the applicant establishes that,
pursuant to the implementation ... of a family planning policy that involves or results in forced
abortion or coerced sterilization, the applicant has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to
undergo sterilization or has been persecuted for failure or refusal to do so, and that the applicant
is unable or unwilling to return to, or to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country
because of such persecution. An applicant (and the applicant's spouse, if also an applicant) shall
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Matter of Chang. 125 The January 1993 Final Rule also differed from other
administrative actions in that it mandated, rather than suggested, that
refugee status be granted to individuals facing forced abortion or
sterilization in China upon the proper showing of persecution on account ofS• 126
political opinion. Moreover, the January 1993 Final Rule was not
specific to China's One Child Policy, but encompassed coercive population
control acts-forced abortion or involuntary sterilization-of any
country.
127
Consistent with administrative procedures, the January 1993 Final
Rule was sent to the Federal Register where it was made available for public
inspection. Unfortunately, the January 1993 Rule was never published.
128
In February 1993, the Clinton Administration published new regulations
concerning asylum application; no mention was made of the January 1993
Final Rule. 129 The reason for this omission is unknown.
In an attempt to clarify the Administration's position on this policy,
the BIA referred two cases to Attorney General Janet Reno asking her to
resolve the apparent conflict between Matter of Chang and President Bush's
Executive Order. 13  In December 1993, she formally declined to resolve the
conflict. The Attorney General stated only that the resolution of the two
cases presented did not "require a determination that one or the other of
these standards is lawful and binding."'
31
be found to be a refugee on the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
political opinion if the applicant establishes a well-founded fear that, pursuant to the
implementation . . . of a family planning policy that involves or results in forced abortion or
coerced sterilization, the applicant will be forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo sterilization
or will be persecuted for failure or refusal to do so, and that the applicant is unable or unwilling
to return to, or to avail himself or herself ofthe protection of, that country because of such fear."
Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d at 740 (emphasis added) (citing January 1993 Rule, §
208.13(2)(ii), Att'y Gen. Order No. 1659-93, JA 1652, 1664-65) [hereinafter January 1993 Final Rule].125 Id. (citing Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989)).
126 Asylum was granted on the basis of persecution on account of political opinion. Id. at 740.
127 Id
128 The January 1993 Final Rule was scheduled for publication on January 25, 1993. On January
22, 1993, the recently appointed Director of the Office of Management and Budget issued a directive
prohibiting the publication of new regulations until they were approved by an appropriate agency head
appointed by the Clinton Administration. Id. at 741 (citing 58 Fed. Reg. 6074 (1993)).129 Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 103, 208, 236, 253 (1993)).
130 Id. at 741 (citing Executive Order 12,711 (1993)).
131 Id (quoting Att'y Gen. Order No. 1756-93; JA at 1650).
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Against the background to these legal devices was a sudden increase
in alien smuggling by organized crime gangs in China.132  After being
apprehended, many of these aliens sought asylum in the United States based
on the One Child Policy.1 33 Many of these claims are still pending review
in the federal courts.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Asylum Claims Based on the One Child Policy
1. Judicial Deference Is Due to the BIA 's Decision in Matter Of Chang
Appeals courts have asserted that the BIA has not forfeited its claim
to judicial deference on the issue of asylum claims based on coercive
Chinese population control policies.
134  In spite of the various policies' 35
expressed by the President, the Attorney Generals, and the INS, the BIA has
consistently applied Matter of Chang to asylum claims based on the One
Child Policy. The Second Circuit in Chen Zhou Chai 136 concluded that:
The BIA has consistently applied Matter of Chang to
claims for asylum based on the PRC's coercive population
control practices. Although Congress tried to overrule Chang
by statute, and several former Attorney Generals by regulation,
these attempts have all failed. Thus, we conclude that the
Board's interpretation of the asylum statute in Matter of Chang
is entitled to deference.' 
37
132 See, e.g., Matter of G, Int. Dec. 3215 (BIA 1993). The Golden Venture was a cargo freighter
piloted during its three month voyage by a crew of thirteen Indonesian nationals. The vessel ran aground
off the coast of New York. Pandemonium erupted on board when the ship grounded. Many of the ship's
passengers jumped off the ship and attempted to swim ashore. Id.
Id.
134 See, e.g., Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331 (4th Cir. 1995); Chang Lian Zheng v.
Carroll, 44 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 1995); Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995).
The various policies over the past six years have been described as "an administrative
cacophony undeserving of judicial deference." Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 867 (E.D. Va.
1994) 61lis, J.) (subsequently reversed in a brief per curiam opinion).
Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d at 1342.
137 ld
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The Fourth Circuit in Xin-Chang Zhang138 concurred, stating: "The
[BIA] has repeatedly been on the verge of receiving a new policy; but
throughout the BIA has followed its holding in Matter of Chang every time
it has been asked to consider the PRC 'one child' issue. We therefore
conclude that deference is justified."'
139
Arguably, the BIA could not have applied Matter of Chang if any of
the legislative or executive actions became effective. Unfortunately, there
is substantial doubt as to whether any of these actions have ever had legal
validity. 14  Thus, the several disparate pronouncements have not affected
the BIA's consistent application of Matter of Chang and its claim to judicial
deference. 141
2. Refusing to Follow a Governmental Policy Is an Act of Political
Dissidence
Federal Courts of Appeals evaluating asylum claims based on the
One Child Policy have universally upheld the Matter of Chang decision
based on principles of judicial deference.1 42 In particular, these courts have
found that the BIA's interpretation of the asylum statutes is not
unreasonable 143 and is consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in INS v.
Elias-Zacarias. 144
In Elias-Zacarias, the Supreme Court denied asylum to a Guatemalan
native who fled his country after a guerrilla organization attempted to
conscript him into military service. 145  The Court construed the statute's
requirement of persecution on account of political opinion146 as referring to
persecution on account of the victim's political opinion, not persecution on
138 Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d at 750.
139 Id; Si v. Slattery, 864 F. Supp. 397, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
140 See supra part ll.D.2 for a regulatory history of asylum claims based on the One Child Policy.
See also infra part III.A.3 concluding that the various pronouncements of the legislative and executive
branch are inconsistently evaluated by the federal courts of appeals.
141 Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331, 1342 (4th Cir. 1995); Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery,
55 F.3d 732, 750 (2d Cir. 1995).
142 See Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d at 751; Chen Zhou Chai v. Carrroll, 48 F.3d at 1342.'43 Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d at 751.
344 INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 112 S. Ct. 812, 117 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1992).
345 Id. at 480.
146 8 U.S.C. § 11301(a)(42)(A).
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account of the persecutor's opinion. 147  The Court required that Elias-
Zacarias' resistance to join the guerrillas was an expression of his political
opinion, and further, that he had a well-grounded fear that the guerrillas
would have persecuted him "because of that political opinion, rather than
because of his refusal to fight with them."'
148
Federal courts have found Matter of Chang consistent with Elias-
Zacarias. In Matter of Chang, the BIA similarly held that severe
government sanctions for an asylum applicant's violations of its population
control policy do not necessarily constitute persecution on account of
political opinion. 49  Even if the applicant can characterize his failure to
comply with the population control policy as a political opinion, the
applicant must still demonstrate that the government's actions against the
applicant, even to the extent those actions or threats involve forced abortion
or involuntary sterilization, were taken for a reason other than to enforce the
population control policy. 150  Since the statute makes the persecutor's
motive critical, 151 applicants must supply proof' 52 that they were persecuted
for their political opinion.
Within the context of the One Child Policy, the BIA has determined
that China is merely carrying out a legitimate population control policy and
applying it generally to its citizens. In Matter of Chang, the BIA found that
China's attempt at controlling population growth was an objectively
legitimate and nonpolitical goal. 153  Additionally, the BIA found that
opposition to the One Child Policy, manifested by a desire to have more
147
The "mere existence of a generalized 'political' motive underlying the guerrillas' forced
recruitment is inadequate to establish (and, indeed goes far to refute) the proposition that Elias-Zacarias





Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989).
150 Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331, 1342 (4th Cir. 1995); Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery,
55 F.3d 732, 751 (2d Cir. 1995) (INS v. Elias-Zacarias teaches "that an applicant for refugee status must
establish a fear of reprisal that is different in kind from a desire to avoid exactions (however harsh) that a
foreign overnment may place upon its citizens.").
INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482.
152 The Court noted that applicants do not need to supply direct proof of the persecutor's motives,
but that they must provide some evidence of them, either direct or circumstantial. INS v. Elias-Zacarias,
502 U.S. at 483.153 Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989). The Board did not find the Chinese One Child
Policy persecutory on its face. The Chinese government, the Board noted, is "faced with the difficulty of
providing for China's vast population in good years and in bad." Id.
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children, was not a political opinion.' 54 The courts have thus concluded that
the BIA's interpretation in Matter of Chang is consistent with the teachings
of Elias-Zacarias and with the statute because it focuses upon the political
belief of the victim and the motivation of the alleged persecutor.
The BIA and the reviewing courts unfortunately ignore the difference
between a legitimate goal and the means by which these goals are
implemented. Given the size of the Chinese population, it is not difficult to
conclude that controlling population growth is a legitimate goal. However,
a policy that uses forced abortion and involuntary sterilization as a means of
achieving its goal ceases to be legitimate.' 55 The very purpose of asylum is
to provide a refuge for victims of governmental policies that violate human
rights.
156
Moreover, the BIA's reasoning that a desire to have more children is
not a political opinion is flawed. 157 Refusing to follow an official policy in
an authoritarian country is tantamount to political dissidence. This
assertion is reinforced by the urgent priority assigned to that policy by high
level PRC officials and the local party cadres, and the severe consequences
which may be imposed for a violation of that policy.' 59  In addition, the
CCP monopolizes decision-making authority. 16  The Chinese Constitution
154 ld
155 See Blanco-Lopez v. INS, 858 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that while a government
has the right to prosecute individuals accused of criminal activity, such as supporting a guerrilla faction,
when violence or threats of violence usurp legal procedure, then persecution on the basis of political
opinion exists).156 Anker & Posner, supra note 105, at 55 (emphasizing that human rights violations in the country
of orign is the primary factor in evaluating asylum claims).
But see Rebecca 0. Bresnick, Reproductive Ability as a Sixth Ground of Persecution Under the
Domestic and International Definitions of Refugee, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 121, 137-43 (1995)
(concluding that asylum claims based on reproductive rights violations do not fall under persecution on
account of political opinion because the persecution is based on ability to reproduce).
158
MOSHER, supra note 4, at 328. Chinese immigrant, who after enforcing the One Child Policy
for the Chinese Communist Party in China, found herself pregnant for a second time while on leave in the
United States. She sought asylum in the United States on the basis of both political opinion and
membership in a particular social group. She expressed her view that the Immigration and Naturalization
Service's description of the One Child Policy as merely a social policy uniformly applied throughout China
as "naive, if not down right disingenuous. In China, any dissent from any official policy was an act of
political rebellion." Id. (emphasis in original). MOSHER, supra note 4, at 328-32 (reprinting Attorney
General Meese's Memorandum to the Immigration and Naturalization Service stating that the PRC views
violations of the One Child Policy as an act of political dissidence).159 MOSHER, supra note 4, at 328-32. See also discussion supra part I1.A of the historical
develo gent of the One Child Policy.
Country Reports on Human Rights, supra note 37, at 561.
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protects human rights, but they are frequently ignored in practice, and
challenges to the CCP's political authority are often dealt with harshly and
arbitrarily. 16 1  Moreover, the regulations governing family planning treat
those individuals interfering with the implementation of the law as
"counterrevolutionaries." 62
3. The Several Executive and Legislative Pronouncements Are
Inconsistently Evaluated
Courts of Appeals reviewing asylum claims based on the One Child
Policy have found that none of the legislative and executive actions have
successfully overruled Matter of Chang. Importantly, the validity of the
several pronouncements have a bearing on whether the BIA has preserved
its claim to judicial deference by consistently applying Matter of Chang. 163
The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") empowers federal courts to set
aside any agency action found to be without observance of required
procedures. 164 Therefore, if a rule is not subjected to a notice and comment
period before taking effect, the agency runs the risk of having the rule
declared invalid by a reviewing court.
Both the Second and Fourth Circuits have reviewed the legal validity
of the January 1990 Interim Rule. 165 Both Circuit Courts agreed that even if
the January 1990 Interim Rule was properly promulgated as a legislative
rule, it would have been repealed by publication of the July 1990 Final
Rule. 166  However, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the Second Circuit
161
Country Reports on Human Rights, supra note 37, at 561.162 MOSHER, supra note 4, at 315.
163 For example, if the January 1990 Interim Rule was legally valid from January 1990 until July
1990, then the BIA could not have applied Matter of Chang during that period.
164
Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 744 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)). A
properly promulgated legislative rule is subject to the notice and comment requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act [hereinafter APA]. If legislative rules are not subjected to a notice and
comment period, they may be invalidated by the federal courts. Importantly, rules may be excepted from
the notice and comment requirements if they fall into one of the narrowly construed categories of § 553 of
the APA. Three exceptions potentially apply to the January 1990 Interim Rule: (i) foreign affairs; (ii)
interpretative rules; and (iii) good cause. Id. at 744 (citing Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Shalala, 38
F.3d 1225, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).165 See discussion supra part 1I.D.2 for a regulatory history of the One Child Policy.
166 The Second Circuit found that the January 1990 Interim Rule had not been subjected to the
notice and comment requirements of the APA. In addition, the court noted that the January 1990 Interim.
Rule did not fall under any of the statutory exceptions to notice and comment provided by 5 U.S.C. § 553
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declaring the January 1990 Interim Rule "interpretive" and thus excepted
from the notice and comment requirements of the APA. 16 7  If the Fourth
Circuit's reasoning is correct, then the January 1990 Interim Rule was
properly promulgated and valid for seven months until the publication of
the July 1990 Final Rule. 168 During those seven months, the BIA could not
have applied Matter of Chang. This assertion casts doubt on the courts'
determination that the BIA is due judicial deference because it consistently
applied its decision and that the several pronouncements were never legally
effective.
169
Other executive and legislative attempts to overrule Matter of Chang
have also been found unsuccessful. The Courts have denied asylum based
on the application of Executive Order 12,711 for two reasons. First, as a
general rule, "there is no private right of action to enforce obligations
imposed on the executive branch officials by executive orders." The
source of authority for Executive Order 12,711 is the President's general
constitutional powers to direct the exercise of powers statutorily delegated
to executive branch officials. 171  Because Congress did not specifically
delegate this authority to the President, Executive Order 12,711 does not
have a specific foundation in legislative action. 172  Second, an executive
order is privately enforceable only if it was intended to create a private
(foreign affairs, interpretive rulings, and good cause). Agency actions that fail to observe the proper
procedures are unlawful under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d at 744.
167 The Second Circuit was responding to appellant's argument that the January 1990 Interim Rule
was never properly revoked. The APA requires an agency revoking an existing rule to afford notice and an
opportunity for public comment. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. The Fourth Circuit, by contrast, found the
January 1990 Interim Rule interpretative in that it merely stated what the Immigration and Naturalization
Service believed the statute to mean. Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331, 1340-41 (4th Cir. 1995)
(citing Jerri's Ceramic Arts, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 874 F.2d 205, 207 (4th Cir. 1989);
American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).168 The Fourth Circuit did not address this issue in Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331 (4th
Cir. 1995).169 See discussion supra part Iii.A.1 of the court's deference to Matter of Chang.
170 An executive order is privately enforceable only if it is issued pursuant to a statutory mandate or
delegation of congressional authority. Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d at 1338 (citing Facchiano
Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 987 F.2d 206, 210 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d 48, 114
S. Ct. 80 (1993)); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88, 96 L. Ed.
1153, 72 S. Ct. 863 (1952).
171 Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d at 1338 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135, 71
L. Ed. 160, 47 S. Ct. 21 (1926) ("The ordinary duties of officers prescribed by statute come under the
general administrative control of the President by virtue of the general grant to him of the executive power,
and he may properly supervise and guide their construction of statutes under which they act")).
172 Id
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cause of action. 173  By its own express terms, Executive Order 12,711
indicates that it was an internal directive from the President to his Attorney
General, instructing him to exercise his statutory authority to provide for
enhanced consideration of certain asylum claims. 174
Finally, federal courts evaluating the January 1993 Final Rule have
generally found it unenforceable. 175  A rule is presumed ineffective until
published. 176 In order for a rule to be binding it must be effective. 177 Since
the January 1993 Final Rule was never published, it remained ineffective,
and thus, unenforceable.
178
In summary, the various legislative and executive attempts at
overruling Matter of Chang have been unsuccessful. The only exception is
the January 1990 Interim Rule. The Circuit Courts' analyses of the rule
appear more driven by a desire to uphold the BIA's decision than by a
desire to seriously scrutinize the rule's procedural history. 179 In any event,
even if the January 1990 Interim Rule had been valid, it is unclear whether
that would lead to the conclusion that the BIA forfeited its claim to judicial
deference or that Matter of Chang was permanently overruled.
173
Id (citing Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 236 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied 426 U.S. 966, (1976)).
4 Id (citing 55 Fed. Reg. 13897 (Apr. 11, 1990)).
175 Id at 1341 (listing the district court cases which considered whether to enforce the January
1993 Final Rule even though it was not published; all but one found the rule unenforceable). Xin-Chang
Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 748 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that the January 1993 Final Rule was never
successfully promulgated because the rule never became effective by its own terms).
176 Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d at 748; cf. United Technologies Corp. v. OSHA, 836 F.2d
52, 54 (2d Cir. 1987) ("The amendments ... were promulgated when they were published in the Federal
Register.").
177 Id
178 Additionally, the January 1993 Final Rule suffered from another defect. It could not have been
effective, even if published, because its effective date was never filled in. Id.
179 See Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d at 744; Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331,
1340 (4th Cir. 1995).
VOL. 5 No. 3
CHINA 'S EUGENICS LAW
B. Analysis of Future Asylum Claims Based on The Eugenics Law
1. A Particular Social Group Can Be Found
Chinese victims of the One Child Policy have asserted their asylum
claims based on persecution on account of membership in a particular social
group and on account of political opinion. 180  Both bases for asylum have
been largely unsuccessful.' 81  Asylum claims based on the Eugenics Law
are likely to involve similar claims. 182 However, application of either social
group or political opinion theories to persecution on account of the
Eugenics Law may yield different results.
The application of "particular social group" is problematic for two
reasons. First, the legislative history is uninformative and sparse.' 83  The
1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 184 was the first
international compact to adopt a universal refugee definition, rather than
one tied to a particular national or ethnic group. 185 The Convention defines
refugees as those who face a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
one of the five enumerated statutory grounds. 186 This refugee definition is
broader than the prior practice because it links refugee status to fear of
180 See, e.g., Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989); Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d
732; Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331.181 See, e.g., Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (B1A 1989); Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery 55 F.3d
732; Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331.
182 Since the One Child Policy and the Eugenics Law are both population control policies applied
generally to the Chinese population independent of race, religion, or nationality, the two bases for asylum
available to applicants forced to undergo forced abortion and involuntary sterilization are membership in a
particular social group and political opinion. See INA § 101(a)(42XA); 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)(A).183 When Congress incorporated the U.N. Protocol into U.S. immigration law through the 1980
Refugee Act, it adopted the Protocol's definition of "refugee" without many substantive changes. Neither
the legislative history of the Refugee Act, nor the U.N. Convention drafters' intent provides guidance in
interpreting the social group term. Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on
Persecution Due to Membership in a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 505, 509 (1993).184 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6260, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
185 ld
186 Article I of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees provides: "A. For the purposes
of the present Convention, the term "refugee" shall apply to any person who: (2) [As a result of events
occurring before I January 1951] and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group-or political opinion, is outside the country of
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it." Id.
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persecution rather than to a specific crisis or nationality group and it
expands the reasons that warrant refugee status. 18 7  The fourth ground-
membership in a particular social group-was introduced by the Swedish
representative to the Convention without much explanation 188 and adopted
by the Convention without recorded comment. 189  It appears that the
delegates were far more concerned with restricting the geographical and
time limits of the refugee definition than with discussing the categories of
persecution. 190
The Refugee Act of 1980 adopted the Convention's definition of
"refugee."' 191  Unfortunately, the legislative history on the social group
aspect sheds little light on its intended scope. 192 Congress gave no explicit
indication of its understanding of the purpose or meaning of this term.193
Second, developed case law indicates vague judicial standards
applied inconsistently.' 94  The lack of a uniform approach towards asylum
claims based on membership in a particular social group has led to the
187 Fullerton, supra note 183, at 509.
188 In support of his amendment, the Swedish representative stated that "experience ha[s] shown
that certain refugees ha[vel been persecuted because they belonged to particular social groups. The draft
[c]onvention [makes] no provision for such cases, and one designed to cover them should be accordingly
included." A/CONF.2/SR.3 at 14 (1951). Arthur C. Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a
Social Group as a Basis for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 39, 41 n.15 (1983); see also
Daniel Compton, Asylum for Persecuted Social Groups: a Closed Door Left Slightly Ajar, 62 WASH. L.
REV. 913, 925 (1987).
189 The amendment was adopted by a vote of fourteen to zero with eight abstentions. There were
no negative votes cast. The record does not disclose which delegations favored the amendment and which
delegations abstained. Article I of the draft convention, as amended to include the persecution based on
social group, then passed by a vote of twenty-two to zero with one abstention. Fullerton, supra note 183,
at 510iting A/CONF.2/SR.23 at 8).
Fullerton, supra note 183, at 510 (citing A/CONF.2/SR.23 at 19-24).
191 The Conference Committee Report stated that the Refugee Act's definition of "refugee" was
accepted "with the understanding that it is based directly upon the language of the Protocol and it is
intended that the provision be construed consistent with the Protocol." Fullerton, supra note 183, at 513
(citinjgS. Rep. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 20 (1980)).
See S. Rep. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 20 (1980).
193 The only direct comment was made in 1968 by President Johnson, when he sent the 1967
Protocol to the Senate for ratification: "The Protocol constitutes a comprehensive Bill of Rights for
refugees fleeing their country because of persecution on account of their political views, race, religion,
nationality, or social ties." The Senate ratified. the Protocol, which contained the Geneva Convention
refugee definition, in 1968. Congress later enacted the Refugee Act of 1980, which was intended, in part,
to implement the Protocol by expressly conforming the statutory definition to the Convention/Protocol
definition. Fullerton, supra note 183, at n.44 (citing 114 Cong. Rec. 24,628 (1968)).
194 See, e.g., Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. 2986 (BIA 1985); Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d
621 (1st Cir. 1985); Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 909 F.2d I (9th Cir. 1990).
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recognition of previously unrecognized groups, such as families, 195 gay men
and lesbian women, 196 the educated elite in Ghana,' 97 and former members
of the national police of El Salvador. 198 Yet, it has not been extended to
others such as Chinese victims of the One Child Policy, 199 women
previously raped and beaten by guerrilla forces,20 members of a taxi
drivers' cooperative in El Salvador,20 and urban draft-age men not in the
Salvadoran army,20 2 among others. 20 3  Examination of the decisions
struggling to define "social group" reveals incongruencies in U.S.
jurisprudence.
In Matter of Acosta,204 the BIA concluded that a "particular social
group" is a group of individuals who share a "common immutable• • 205 • •206
characteristic." Analyzing the four specific bases of persecution -
race, religion, nationality, and political opinion-the BIA concluded that
each of them describes persecution targeted at a characteristic that "either is
beyond the power of an individual to change or is so fundamental to
195 See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 909 F.2d at I (rejecting young urban working-class males of
military age as a cognizable social group and describing a family as the quintessential social group); but
see Estrada-Posadas v. NS, 924 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 199 1) (A Guatemalan woman's claim of persecution
due to family membership where her cousin had been kidnapped and her uncle killed was rejected. The
court held that Congress did not intend to grant refugee status based on family membership).196 Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, A23 220 644 (BIA 1990).
197 Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985).
198 Matter of Fuentes, 19 1. & N. Dec. 658 (BIA 1988).
199 Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989) (Chinese citizens opposed to One Child Policy not
a particular social group).
200 Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991) (women who have previously been raped and
beaten by guerrillas do not constitute a social group because they are not a recognizable and discrete
gr°UP~o I
Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. 2986 (BIA 1985).
202 Matter of Vigil, 19 1. & N. Dec. 572 (BIA 1988).
203 Parish, supra note 105, at 923.
204 Mr. Acosta claimed to be part of a cooperative of taxi drivers in San Salvador who had not
participated in a guerrilla-led work stoppage. The BIA rejected Mr. Acosta's asylum claim finding that a
voluntary association of taxi drivers was not a social group within the meaning of the statute. Matter of
AcostaInt. Dec. 2986 (BIA 1985).
25'Id
206 To interpret the term "social group," the BIA turned to canons of statutory construction that
direct that general words included in a list of more specific words be construed in a manner consistent with
the more specific words. Id.
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individual identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be
changed."
207
Other courts have given the term "social group" a slightly different, if
208not broader, interpretation. In Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, the First
Circuit defined "social group" with the guidance of the Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status ("UNHCR
Handbook"). 20 9  The court emphasized that Ananeh-Firempong had
described persecution of people who shared her background and social
status. 2 1  The court expressly noted that the fears of persecution voiced by
Ananeh-Firempong arose from characteristics beyond her power to
211change. In terms of the Matter of Acosta test for social group, Ananeh-. . • .. 212
Firempong faced danger due to immutable characteristics.
In Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS,2 13  the Ninth Circuit addressed the
definition of "particular social group." Finding that the legislative history,
U.S. case law, and the UNHCR Handbook were unhelpful, the Ninth Circuit
embarked on its own statutory construction of the term. 21  The courtconcluded that a "social group" required a "voluntary associational
207 Id
208 Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985).
209
The UNHCR Handbook states in relevant part:. "A 'particular social group' normally
comprises persons of similar background, habits, or social status . . . . Membership of [sic] such a
particular social group may be at the root of persecution because there is no confidence in the group's
loyalty to the Government or because the political outlook, antecedents or economic activity of its
members, or the very existence of the social group as such, is held to be an obstacle to the Government's
policies." OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND 1967 PROTOCOL
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, U.N. Doc. HCR/PRO/4, paras. 77-78(1979) [hereinafter UNHCR
Handbook].
210 Based on the elements set forth in the UNHCR Handbook, the court concluded that Ananeh-
Firempong had adequately alleged a fear of persecution due to her membership in several particular social
groups from Ghana: the Ashanti tribe, the educated class of professionals and business people, and those





213 The two claimants sought asylum in the United States alleging persecution as members of the
particular social group comprised of "young, urban, working-class males of military age who had never
served in the military or otherwise expressed support for the government of El Salvador." Sanchez-Trujillo
v. INS 801 F.2d 1571, 1573 (9th Cir. 1986).
H4 The court described the legislative history as "generally uninformative on this point." Id. at
1575. Additionally, the court characterized the UNHCR Handbook as a "significant source of guidance."
However, it found the UNHCR Handbook as providing little assistance at a workable definition of
particular social group. Id. at 1576.
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relationship among the purported members, which imparts some common
characteristic that is fundamental to their identity as a member of that
discrete social group."215 Applying this test, the court found that the
claimants did not constitute a particular social group; rather than being a
small, readily identifiable group, they are a "major segment of the• • ,216
population of an embattled nation."
Under its narrow interpretation, the BIA has firmly rejected the
argument that people who oppose the PRC's coercive One Child Policy
comprise a particular social group. 217 The BIA claims that opposition to the
policy is not an immutable characteristic even to the extent that involuntary
sterilization may occur, and thus policy opponents do not rise to the level of
a particular social group.
2 18
However, where the asylum claim is based on the Eugenics Law, a
different result may be obtained. If the asylum seeker can make out a claim
based on persecution due to a serious genetic defect, the claimant may be
able to establish his or her membership in a particular social group because
a genetic defect is an immutable characteristic.
219
Under a test emphasizing a group's background and social status, a
claimant persecuted by the Eugenics Law could also establish a particular
social group.220 Evidence suggests that Chinese with mental deficiencies,
for example, are considered a burden because they are typically not
productive members of society. 221 In addition, the birth of handicapped
children undermines the government's stated goal of limiting population
growth by allowing only one child per couple. Handicapped Chinese are
on the lowest rung of Chinese society, generally the victims of prejudice.
Even when handicapped Chinese are not abandoned, they lack the necessary
215 Id. See also Fullerton, supra note 183, at 555 (identifying three elements in the Ninth Circuit's
Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS definition of "social group:" (1) voluntary associational relationship; (2) common
characteristic (or impulse interest); and (3) a characteristic fundamental to their group identity).216 Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d at 1577.
217 Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989).
218 ld
219 An immutable characteristic is a characteristic that is not capable of, or susceptible to, change.
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 602 (9th ed., 1989).220 Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621,623 (1 st Cir. 1985).
221
Supra discussion part II.B.
222
Supra discussion part I.B.
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services for a quality life.223 Thus, the common background and social
status shared by individuals afflicted with serious genetic diseases and
mental deficiencies may likely be found to form a social group under a
background and social status test.
Finally, under the Ninth Circuit's test,224 the claimant faces the
obstacle of proving that a group is a voluntary association of people.
Indeed, the absence of any voluntary association amongst people afflicted
with a serious genetic defect or mental disorder makes this group seem like
the group claimed in Sanchez-Trujillo. It is a group existing in society, but
not a "particular social group."225  However, critics have argued that a
voluntary association factor should not be a prerequisite to finding
persecution based on a social group. 22  The Ninth Circuit appears disturbed
by the size and the heterogeneity of the asserted group if this factor is
eliminated. 227 Thus, a refugee seeking asylum based on the Eugenics Law
is likely to successfully demonstrate the existence of a particular social
group no matter which judicial formulation is applied.
2. The Eugenics Law Persecutes Only a Segment of the Population
In Matter of Chang, the BIA buttressed its holding that the One Child
Policy was not a grounds for asylum, in part, on the legitimacy of the
228policy. Population control, the BIA found, was a proper concern of the
Chinese government. 229  The Eugenics Law, on the other hand, has the
questionable goal of improving the quality of the population. 23  In addition,
the BIA found that the One Child Policy was applied generally and was not
subterfuge for persecuting a portion of society. 23 1 The Eugenics Law, by
223 Supra discussion part II.B.
224 Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
225 Rather than a cohesive or homogenous group, they are a group of disparate individuals with
"different lifestyles, varying interests, diverse cultures, and contrary political leanings." Id. at 1577.
226 Fullerton, supra note 183, at 556. The author notes that the Ninth Circuit's decision is
internally inconsistent. The Ninth Circuit characterizes a family as the quintessential social group.
However, family members may choose not to associate, precluding the voluntary associational factor, and
still be a social group within the Ninth Circuit's test.
227 Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d at 1577; see Fullerton, supra note 183, at 556.
228 Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989).
229 ld
230 See discussion supra part II.B of the Eugenics Law.
231 Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989).
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contrast, applies only to that portion of the Chinese citizenry with genetic
defects. This difference may result in tipping the balance in favor of
granting asylum to victims of the Eugenics Law.
C. Definitive Legislative Action Is Necessary
Even though the analysis employed by the BIA in Matter of Chang
may not apply to an asylum claim based on the Eugenics Law, definitive
legislation is necessary to overrule Matter of Chang. By granting asylum to
victims of forced abortion and involuntary sterilization, the United States
232recognizes these practices as violations of basic human rights.
Reproductive freedom is fundamental to one's identity.233  Notably,
legislation designed to protect against such atrocities is consistent with the
Refugee Act's humanitarian goals.
234
Moreover, legislation effectively overruling Matter of Chang can be
redacted to preserve the requirements inherent in the Act, including the
Attorney General's discretionary power.235 For example, the January 1993
Final Rule, if it had been promulgated effectively, would have recognized
persecution on account of Chinese population control policies as
persecution on account of political opinion. Under a rule similar to the
January 1993 Final Rule, an asylum seeker would still need to prove that his
fear of persecution is well-founded by supplying objective evidence.
1. Temporary Protected Status Inadequate
Additionally, legislative action is necessary because the existing
remedies for refugees fleeing reproductive rights violations is inadequate.
Affording Temporary Protected Status2 36 ("TPS") to refugees fleeing
232 See REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD POPULATION CONFERENCE, 1974, at § 14(0, U.N.
Sales No. E. 75 XII.3 (Aug. 19-30, 1974) (describing reproductive rights as a basic right of all couples and
individuals).233 See Nickerson, supra note 94.
234 See generally Anker & Posner, supra note 105, at 55.
235 See, e.g., Bresnick, supra note 157 (arguing that a sixth ground based on reproductive ability
should be added to the existing five grounds enumerated under 8 U.S.C. § I l0l(a)(42XA)).
236 In 1987, Congressman Mazzoli, then chair of the House Subcommittee on immigration matters,
proposed an alternative to the country-specific relief of previous legislation, instead establishing a general
statutory framework for what would remain discretionary executive-branch decisions to grant temporary
safe haven. Adopting Congressman Mazzoli's proposal in 1990, Congress added § 244A to the INA,
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persecution due to Chinese population control policies is insufficient. TPS
is an inadequate response because it is a temporary solution to a problem
that is long-standing and unlikely to change. Furthermore, TPS is subject to
foreign policy considerations since the executive branch denies or grants
status depending upon U.S. diplomatic relations with China.
237
2. Floodgates Will Not Open
A likely argument against granting permanent asylum to Chinese
fleeing persecutory population control policies is that it will open up the
floodgates for the immigration of 1.2 billion Chinese. This fear is
exaggerated. Refugees seeking asylum based on a fear of being sterilized or
forced to abort will still need to meet the several requirements of section
101 of the INA, including supplying objective evidence of their fear of. 238
persecution. From the refugee's point of view, many Chinese will not be
willing to leave behind family and friends. 239 Although many Chinese will
take the risk of immigration for a better life, many cannot afford the steep
cost of departure. 24  Finally, many Chinese will not be willing to undertake
the harsh voyage to a new country.
24 1
which authorizes the Attorney General to grant Temporary Protected Status [hereinafter TPS] to nationals
of foreign states in which armed conflict, natural disaster, or other circumstances pose a serious threat to
personal safety or the ability to handle the return of aliens. TPS may be granted for up to 18 months, and
may be extended if the Attorney General finds that the reasons for the initial granting of the status
continue. Work authorization accompanies TPS status. 8 U.S.C. § 244A.237 See 8 U.S.C. § 244A.
238 See discussion supra part II.D. 1.
239 See, e.g., Linda Cipriani, Gender and Persecution: Protecting Women Under the International
Refugee Law, 7 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 511, 545 (1993).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Effective legislative action that will grant asylum to refugees fleeing
China's coercive population control policies is necessary. It is clear that
past executive and legislative actions have demonstrated an intent to
provide asylum to individuals who claim persecution on account of
reproductive rights violations. For a variety of procedural, and at times
unexplained reasons, these actions have been ineffective. The result has
been that the BIA's decision in Matter of Chang continues to control
asylum claims based on China's One Child Policy. Asylum claims based on
the Eugenics Law, however, can be distinguished from claims based on the
One Child Policy. As such, analysis of these claims under Matter of Chang
should lead to a grant of asylum. This disparate result should be avoided by
appropriate definite legislation that covers any kind of reproductive rights
violations, including the types of abuses found in the implementation of the
One Child Policy and the Eugenics Law.
For seventeen years, China has implemented its One Child Policy
with little regard for or recognition of human rights abuses. Today, China
un-apologetically implements a Eugenics Law aimed at reducing the birth
of "defective" children. Legislation designed to provide enhanced
consideration of asylum claims based on China's population control policies
would be consistent with the humanitarian intent of the Refugee Act, and
would not equate to opening the floodgates to millions of Chinese seeking
refuge. Congress should act to amend the INA and provide victims of
reproductive rights violations what the Refugee Act was meant to give:
protection.
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